A Chronology of Declining Oversight
The erosion of Canada’s independent investigative capacity did not occur overnight. The trajectory of CORE’s demise began shortly after Prime Minister Mark Carney assumed office earlier this year. Despite the high expectations surrounding the mandate of the ombudsperson, the position remained unfilled for over a year. During this time, the office essentially became a placeholder, unable to initiate new investigations or advance pending cases. By June 2026, the government declared the office ineffective, citing its inability to produce results, and opted to permanently shutter the agency.
The history of the National Contact Point, which the government now touts as the primary mechanism for responsible business conduct, dates back over 26 years. Created to promote the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises—a set of non-binding recommendations for ethical business behavior—the NCP has historically functioned as a voluntary mediation platform rather than a quasi-judicial body. Since 2000, the Canadian NCP has handled 33 cases. Of those, only three reached a formal joint agreement, and even those successes were limited in scope, often failing to address the fundamental human rights violations initially alleged by claimants.
The Structural Deficit: Mediation vs. Investigation
The core critique leveled against the government’s new reliance on the NCP is the fundamental difference between mediation and independent fact-finding. Catherine Coumans, research coordinator for MiningWatch Canada, has been a vocal opponent of the consolidation, arguing that the NCP lacks the "teeth" necessary to hold multinational corporations accountable.
"What we wanted the ombudsman to be able to do was exactly what was missing from the National Contact Point: the power to do independent investigations and make binding findings of fact," Coumans stated. Unlike an ombudsperson, who can subpoena documents, interview witnesses, and issue formal reports on whether a violation occurred, the NCP is designed to facilitate dialogue. If a company refuses to participate in good faith, the NCP has limited leverage to force engagement or sanction the entity.
For many stakeholders, this shift signifies a return to a "business as usual" environment for Canadian mining and oil and gas firms operating in jurisdictions with weak regulatory frameworks. With the closure of CORE, there is no longer a centralized, specialized body in Canada with the mandate to conduct formal investigations into allegations of displacement, environmental pollution, or complicity in local violence.
Impact on Global Communities: The Case of Kibali
The human cost of this institutional vacuum is best illustrated by the ongoing struggle of John Namegabe Bugabo and the communities of Mege and Bandayi in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Representing 129 individuals displaced by the expansion of the Kibali gold mine—a project 45% owned by Canadian-based Barrick Gold—Bugabo’s journey through the Canadian grievance system has been marked by frustration and institutional apathy.
Bugabo’s initial complaint, filed in 2022, alleged that the 2021 resettlement process was carried out through police and military force, resulting in the destruction of homes, schools, and essential agricultural land. Barrick Gold has consistently denied these allegations, maintaining that the resettlement was a government-led initiative.
When the NCP’s mediation process failed to yield a resolution, the case reached a standstill. The NCP’s final report offered only generic recommendations—such as suggesting the company improve transparency—rather than addressing the specific demands for compensation and restoration of livelihoods. Having seen other NCPs, such as that of the Netherlands, successfully broker historic settlements in similar labour disputes, Bugabo finds the Canadian model particularly disheartening. "The difference is that the Netherlands NCP is more free, it is independent," he noted, highlighting the contrast between a body that merely facilitates conversation and one that actively seeks accountability.
The Conflict of Interest Debate
A recurring concern regarding the Canadian NCP is its physical and administrative location within Global Affairs Canada. Specifically, the office sits within the Trade Strategy Bureau, a department primarily focused on promoting Canadian exports and commercial interests abroad. Critics argue this creates an inherent conflict of interest: the same ministry responsible for lobbying for Canadian businesses on the global stage is also tasked with policing their conduct.
This tension was brought into sharp focus by the 2016 complaint filed by the Swiss NGO Bruno Manser Fonds against the real estate firm Sakto Corp. The case involved allegations of money laundering and environmental destruction in Malaysia. The ensuing process was marred by accusations of political interference. Internal documents and reports from the OECD Investment Committee later revealed that the process lacked transparency and was undermined by aggressive lobbying from the company, including the involvement of a Canadian Member of Parliament.
The OECD’s subsequent findings were damning, stating that the Canadian NCP failed to ensure an equitable process and contributed to a widespread perception of partiality. Despite these findings, the government has moved to place even more responsibility on this same office, promising an "enhanced staff complement" without addressing the systemic issues identified by international observers.
Broader Implications for Canadian Industry
Canada holds a unique position in the global economy, as it is the corporate headquarters for roughly half of the world’s publicly traded mining and mineral exploration companies. Because of this massive footprint, the efficacy of Canadian oversight mechanisms has global ramifications.
International advocacy groups, including SOMO and OECD Watch, have long argued that Canada’s failure to maintain a robust, independent watchdog undermines the global "Race to the Top" in ESG (Environmental, Social, and Governance) standards. If Canadian firms are not held to high standards at home, they may be less incentivized to adhere to international human rights norms in the Global South.
"It is important for these mechanisms to be strong," says Joseph Wilde-Ramsing of SOMO. "If the company knows that the problem will be taken at hand and that there are real consequences, they will be incentivized to prevent these harms from occurring in the first place."
Looking Ahead: The Path to Reform
As the Canadian NCP undergoes its second periodic peer review by the OECD, the government faces mounting pressure to clarify how it intends to bridge the gap left by CORE. Civil society organizations are calling for the immediate reinstatement of an independent ombudsperson with the power to compel evidence.
While the federal government maintains that it remains committed to responsible business conduct, the current reliance on a non-binding, government-housed mediation office appears to fall short of the demands from those on the front lines. Without structural reform—such as separating the office from the Trade Ministry or granting it investigative subpoena powers—the current transition risks leaving thousands of affected individuals around the world without a viable path to justice.
For individuals like John Namegabe Bugabo, the closure of CORE is more than just a bureaucratic reshuffle; it represents a loss of faith in Canada’s commitment to the rule of law. As he continues to advocate for the displaced residents of the Kibali mine, his experience serves as a sobering reminder of the consequences of weakening corporate accountability. In the absence of a truly independent, empowered watchdog, the responsibility for addressing corporate malfeasance remains a contentious and unresolved chapter in Canadian foreign policy.
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